Any contributor may choose not to be named, and is not asked for a reason.
Sources
This report rests on the work of Myanmar's journalists. Every event in the MCARI dataset was first reported by a news organisation working in or on Myanmar, many of them under conditions that put their staff at risk.
Suggested citation
MCARI (2026). The Myanmar Conflict Monitor: Q1 2026. Myanmar Conflict Analysis Research Institute.
Licence
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). Copy, redistribute and adapt for any purpose, including commercially, with credit to MCARI and an indication of any changes.
This applies to the report. It is not a licence over the dataset, which is distributed separately under its own terms.
1Executive summary
Panel 1Key figures
Events recorded
5,937
QoQ +6.1% · YoY +68.5%
Fatalities
4,960
QoQ +5.7% · YoY +44.6%
Of them civilians
942
QoQ −10.9% · YoY +23.6%
People detained
9,285
QoQ −26.6% · YoY +92.2%
Recorded displacement
857,498
QoQ +40.8% · YoY +162.5%
Townships affected
282
QoQ +2.9% · YoY +13.7%
Displacement figures count recorded displacement, not distinct people. One person displaced three times appears three times.
The fatality total is a minimum. Events whose sources did not say whether anyone died carry no deaths; a death reported without a number is recorded as three; deaths recorded without a side are not apportioned. None is estimated.
Escalating Kinetic Intensity Without a One-Way Shift in the Frontline — In the first quarter of 2026, the military launched counter-offensives to recapture urban centers lost during 2024, while resistance forces struck back at fortified military bases and operational columns, driving total fatalities up by 5.7%. Yet, despite this intensified operational tempo, territorial control shifts occurred in equal measure on both sides, leaving the overall frontline without any decisive, unidirectional movement in favor of either actor.
Civilian Toll Mounts Outside Major Clashes — The most lethal consequences of the war fell not within large-scale infantry engagements, but on villages, local markets, and displacement shelters struck directly by artillery and aerial bombardment. Civilian fatalities mounted steadily month-on-month to reach their peak in March, with 87.9% occurring in events where the Myanmar military was the primary perpetrator. The aerial bombardment of a monastery sheltering displaced persons in Katha Township, which killed 50 civilians, stood as the single deadliest manifestation of this pattern.
Mass Flight Drives the Displacement Surge — Driven by intensifying ground offensives, recorded displacement rose by 40.8%. However, more than half of this total volume was generated by just five mass-flight events. These displacements were concentrated in towns targeted by incoming military columns, such as Katha and Tagaung, as well as along the Sittwe–Ponnagyun rural corridor as active combat gravitated toward the Rakhine State capital.
2The quarter in review
Throughout the quarter, the military mounted sustained air and ground counter-offensives to regain urban centers and strategic strongholds lost during 2024, while resistance forces countered by striking along primary transport corridors and attacking fortified bases. In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) advanced toward Kyaukpyu and Ponnagyun, steadily shifting the combat theater toward the state capital, Sittwe. Caught in the path of these shifting axes, civilians fled ahead of advancing columns and faced aerial bombardment even within designated places of refuge. The proportion of civilian fatalities climbed steadily each month, culminating in a quarterly peak in March.
January — Counter-Offensives to Regain Urban Strongholds
The Katha Offensive and Mass Displacement — On 2 January, the military opened an intensive offensive against Katha Township, deploying heavy artillery and close air support. The assault triggered the town-wide flight of civilians, with people displaced 100,000 times. We assess that this operation marked the opening phase of the military's early 2026 campaign to recapture lost urban territory across northern Sagaing Region.
Airstrike on a Bhamo Funeral — Outside active combat, an aerial strike hit a civilian funeral in Bhamo Township, followed by a second strike on first responders, killing 22 civilians, including internally displaced persons (IDPs). With international humanitarian access blocked, local responders and their support networks bore the primary burden of emergency medical response and evacuation.
Temporary Hold on Kyauktaga and the Deadliest Combat Day — Joint resistance forces (PDF/NUG/KNLA) entered Kyauktaga and pushed through to the strategic old Yangon–Mandalay highway, holding the town until around midday, though military forces re-established control over their base positions by 11 January at the latest. On 28 January, an engagement outside Kyaukpyu between the AA and military forces resulted in the deadliest single combat day of the entire quarter.
Data Caveat: The 4 January Amnesty — The release of 6,134 individuals under the 4 January state amnesty produced a sharp, statistical spike in monthly prisoner releases; however, this administrative release does not reflect any reduction in ground-level political detentions or arrest patterns.
February — Operations via Proxy Militias and Conscripts
The Recapture of Banmauk — Facing severe ammunition shortages, People’s Defense Forces (PDF) withdrew from Banmauk, allowing military forces and the allied Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA) to re-enter the town behind heavy drone and air support. This engagement demonstrated the military's operational pattern of employing regional proxy forces to reclaim contested territory.
Frontline Deployment of Conscripts and Proxies — In Hpasawng Township, the military deployed ground columns comprising newly inducted conscripts mobilized under the February 2024 conscription law. In Mawkmai Township, clashes broke out between the military-aligned Pa-O National Organization (PNO) militia and the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA). Both events show the military pushing conscripts and local proxies to the frontline in place of its regular combat divisions. (Note: Casualty claims from these clashes represent unilateral assertions by the respective forces).
Killings of Non-Combatants in Thayetchaung (Win Wa) — During operational movements around the Win Wa camp in Thayetchaung Township, military columns detained and summarily executed roughly 20 civilians, including displaced persons and travellers encountered along the transit route.
Airstrike on a Village Market in Ponnagyun — On 24 February, an airstrike struck a crowded village market in Ponnagyun Township—an AA-controlled territory sheltering IDPs—killing 18 civilians, the majority of whom were women and children.
March — Escalating Frontlines and Peak Civilian Lethality
The Rakhine Axis Approaches the Capital — The AA pressed its advance toward Ponnagyun, causing nearly entire rural populations between Sittwe and Ponnagyun to flee, with people displaced 200,000 times as combat edged directly toward the perimeter of the state capital.
The Tagaung Counter-Offensive — In Mandalay Region, the military launched an offensive to retake Tagaung, the final urban center held by resistance forces in the region, with people along the riverbanks displaced 100,000 times. This represented a continuation of the military's urban recapture drive in the central-northern heartland that began in January.
Human Shields in Nyaunglebin and the Katha Monastery Bombing — In Nyaunglebin District, a military column detained over 300 villagers as hostages and human shields, executing 28 civilians. In Katha Township, an airstrike bombed a Buddhist monastery sheltering displaced persons and school students, killing 50 civilians—the deadliest single aerial strike against civilians recorded this quarter.
Airstrike on POWs and the Fall of Win Wa Base — In Ann Township, a military airstrike hit an AA detention facility; according to the AA, the majority of those killed were captured military personnel held as prisoners of war. Conversely, on 11 March, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) overran and seized the strategic Win Wa base in Thayetchaung Township, a position the military had garrisoned for over three decades. These divergent events illustrate that territorial control did not move in a single direction.
3Scale and composition
Surge in Events and Core Drivers
Total conflict events recorded in the first quarter of 2026 increased by 6.1% compared to the fourth quarter of 2025. This escalation was driven primarily by an expansion in armed conflict events (+10.7%) and strategic developments, whereas public protests and civil unrest declined by 17.9%. This structural shift aligns directly with ground dynamics: intensifying kinetic confrontations generated by the military's campaigns to retake lost urban hubs and reciprocal resistance counter-attacks.
Standoff Weapons and Civilian Harm
An analysis of event types highlights the specific mechanisms driving civilian casualties. Standoff artillery and missile strikes targeting civilians totaled 950 events—running nearly parallel to the 1,078 armed clashes recorded across the quarter. This parity indicates that civilian harm was largely inflicted not through close-quarters ground skirmishes, but by indirect artillery fire and aerial bombardment.
Table 1Events and fatalities by event type
Eventtype
Events
Share
QoQ
YoY
Fatalities
Shareoffatalities
Fatalitiesper100events
Protests/CivilUnrest
224
3.8%
−17.9%
−30.2%
0
0.0%
0.0
Coercion
1,434
24.2%
+8.2%
+191.5%
22
0.4%
1.5
ViolenceagainstCivilians
1,606
27.1%
+4.4%
+61.4%
852
17.2%
53.1
ArmedConflict
1,815
30.6%
+10.7%
+34.4%
3,980
80.2%
219.3
StrategicDevelopments
716
12.1%
+10.5%
+202.1%
0
0.0%
0.0
TargetedViolence
41
0.7%
−8.9%
−48.1%
61
1.2%
148.8
Other
101
1.7%
−21.7%
+102.0%
45
0.9%
44.6
Total
5,937
100.0%
—
—
4,960
100.0%
—
The rates in this column run from 0.0 to 219.3 per hundred events, so no total is shown: a single rate across a record in which most events record no death describes no event that occurred.
A dash marks a comparison period that does not exist.
A zero means nothing was recorded, not that nothing happened.
Monthly Trajectory and January Anomaly
January recorded the highest monthly event count of the quarter. This peak reflected high combat volume (672 armed conflict events) alongside an extraordinary concentration of intimidation incidents (310) and troops stationed in villages, schools and monasteries (102), both of which were markedly higher than in subsequent months. Both categories contracted sharply in February. By March, armed conflict events rose to their highest proportion of total monthly events, correlating directly with intensifying ground offensives.
Figure 1Composition of the record by month
All seven event types are plotted, including those at or near zero. A row set in grey moves two percentage points or fewer across the period; the rest carry the slot colour. The last month's point is filled; earlier points are hollow.
Conscription Surge and Landmine Impact
Incidents of forced recruitment and portering reached their quarterly peak in February, coinciding with the operational deployment of columns incorporating newly mobilized conscripts. Concurrently, fatalities from landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) climbed 41.8% over the preceding quarter, claiming 397 lives. Of these, 379 were personnel from the Myanmar military and affiliated armed groups. While incident records document casualty affiliation rather than the origin of individual devices, casualty ratios indicate that mine warfare operated as a primary asymmetric defensive interdiction tactic against advancing military columns along key transit routes.
4Fatalities
Rising Fatalities and Proportions
Total conflict fatalities increased by 5.7% compared to the previous quarter. Although the quarter was two calendar days shorter, the daily fatality average rose from 51.0 to 55.1 deaths per day, confirming that this increase reflected genuine ground escalation rather than temporal variance.
Military and pro-military personnel accounted for 71.5% of total recorded fatalities. As military counter-offensive columns entered territories held by resistance forces, they encountered substantial casualties along primary movement corridors, including ambushes in areas such as Oktwin, the Sagaing–Wetlet road, Falam, and Yinmarbin.
Table 2Fatalities by side and by month
Month
Militaryandpro-coup
Armedopposition
Civilians
Notattributed
Total
Civilianshare
January2026
1,352
130
246
59
1,787
13.8%
February2026
919
105
250
37
1,311
19.1%
March2026
1,273
94
446
49
1,862
24.0%
Period
3,544
329
942
145
4,960
19.0%
Where total fatalities in a month are below 20, the share carries no trend statement in the prose and any chart point is plotted hollow.
Figure 2Fatalities by day
High-Casualty Events and Data Concentration
The ten deadliest events alone accounted for 20.5% (over one-fifth) of all fatalities recorded in the quarter. Consequently, one or two high-intensity engagements can substantially alter the quarterly aggregate, meaning quarter-on-quarter trends must be evaluated alongside this event concentration. Furthermore, fatality figures for these mass-casualty events are based on unilateral claims by the respective actors, recorded as conservative minimum estimates.
Figure 3Concentration of fatalities across events
The 908 events that record a death are 15.3% of all events in the period and carry all 4,960 recorded deaths. The bars above show how much of that total falls in the deadliest few.
Table 3The 5 deadliest days
Date(2026)
Deaths
Ofthemcivilians
Eventsrecorded
Townshipsrecordingadeath
Armed-conflictshareofthatday’sdeaths
28January
328
6
57
10
98.2%
12February
239
17
71
15
93.3%
18March
167
9
79
10
94.6%
8March
156
6
60
11
96.8%
23March
153
24
47
13
84.3%
Deaths on events that could not be resolved to township level, and so counted in the deaths column but not in the townships column: 18 March 2026: 1; 23 March 2026: 69.
Table 4The 10 deadliest events
Date(2026)
Township
Type
Deaths
Ofthemcivilians
28January
Kyaukpyu,Rakhine
Armedclash
200
0
12February
Mawkmai,Shan-South
Armedclash
200
0
8March
Ann,Rakhine
Airstrike
116
0
9February
Hpasawng,Kayah
Armedclash
100
0
18March
Yinmarbin,Sagaing
Armedclash
85
0
8February
Mogoke,Mandalay
Armedclash
80
0
23March
Sagaing (district or region only)
Armedclash
69
0
30March
Chin (district or region only)
Armedclash
60
0
28January
Oktwin,Bago-East
Armedclash
54
0
11March
Thayetchaung,Tanintharyi
Armedclash
53
0
An entry the record places above township level says so: (city level), (district or region only) or (nationwide). This table lists individual events rather than township totals, so the township-level exclusion does not apply to it.
Civilian Fatality Trajectory and Direct Targeting
While total civilian fatalities declined by 10.9% compared to the fourth quarter of 2025, monthly disaggregation reveals an opposing trend. Civilian deaths mounted steadily from 246 in January to 446 in March, demonstrating that the quarterly aggregate obscures a severe intra-quarter escalation.
Crucially, civilians were not killed within large-scale military battles. None of the top ten deadliest combat events included civilian deaths; instead, of 942 recorded civilian fatalities, 822 occurred within direct violence against civilians. Civilian harm was therefore the cumulative product of numerous localized, standoff strikes directed against villages, markets, and shelters. During the peak fatality month of March, the detention and execution of villagers as human shields in Nyaunglebin and the aerial bombardment of a displacement monastery in Katha stood as prominent examples of this vulnerability.
5Geography
Geographic Spread and Protracted Zones
Conflict events spread across 282 townships nationwide, expanding slightly compared to the prior quarter. Of these, 156 townships recorded conflict continuously across all three months of the quarter. For populations residing in these 156 townships, hostilities were uninterrupted, with no single month of respite.
Shifting Kinetic Intensity and the Bago-East Axis
Sagaing Region remained the area with the highest aggregate incident count; however, the combined fatality share of the central dry zone (Sagaing and Magway regions) declined from 34.8% to 29.8% quarter-on-quarter. The quarter’s deadliest engagements occurred mainly in coastal Rakhine (Kyaukpyu and Ann), Southern Shan (Mawkmai), and Kayah State (Hpasawng). In eastern Bago Region, event volume surged by 67.0%, reflecting resistance attacks against bases and columns along the old Yangon–Mandalay highway (Kyauktaga and Oktwin) alongside military sweep operations and human-shield abuses in Nyaunglebin District.
Map 1Events and fatalities by township
Circle size is the number of recorded events; fill is the number of recorded fatalities. A large unfilled circle is a township with many events and no recorded death. 653 of 5,937 events could not be resolved to township level and are not plotted.
Boundaries: MIMU 250k admin-3 (township) polygon boundaries, valid on 15 February 2024. Projection: Albers equal-area conic (d3.geoConicEqualArea).
Divergence Between Incident Frequency and Lethality
Townships recording the highest event frequencies diverged geographically from those recording the highest fatalities. Townships such as Myawaddy, Sittwe, and Hpakant experienced chronic, daily friction yet were absent from the top ten deadliest townships list. Conversely, several high-fatality townships were shaped by one or two acute, mass-casualty events. In Ann Township, for example, only seven events were recorded, yet they produced 117 fatalities, driven almost entirely by the single airstrike on the detention site. Incident density maps illustrate zones of chronic, protracted friction, whereas fatality maps highlight acute points where kinetic operations reached peak lethality. (Note: Only four townships—Kyaukpyu, Thayetchaung, Yinmarbin, and Myingyan—appeared simultaneously on both the top-ten incident and fatality lists).
Table 5The 10 most affected townships
Most events
Most fatalities
Township
Region or state
Events
Fatalities
Township
Region or state
Events
Fatalities
Yinmarbin
Sagaing
136
110
Kyaukpyu
Rakhine
100
352
Myawaddy
Kayin
135
53
Mawkmai
Shan-South
31
229
Sittwe
Rakhine
126
75
Thayetchaung
Tanintharyi
124
141
Thayetchaung
Tanintharyi
124
141
Mogoke
Mandalay
61
135
Myingyan
Mandalay
123
91
Ann
Rakhine
7
117
Pale
Sagaing
112
52
Yinmarbin
Sagaing
136
110
Hpakant
Kachin
103
34
Hpasawng
Kayah
32
105
Kyaukpyu
Rakhine
100
352
Kyauktaga
Bago-East
27
93
Kawkareik
Kayin
95
36
Myingyan
Mandalay
123
91
Wetlet
Sagaing
94
51
Nattalin
Bago-West
59
90
4 townships appear in both rankings.
Township-level figures use only events resolved to township level and are grouped by region and township together. 653 events in this period could not be resolved to township level and are excluded from this table.
Subnational Civilian Impact and Geocoding Limitations
Sagaing Region continued to record the highest absolute civilian death toll, with 292 fatalities. In Kachin State, civilian fatalities (81) exceeded military/pro-military deaths (48). The non-combat airstrike on a funeral in Bhamo Township typified this elevated civilian vulnerability.
Technically, Map 1 excludes 653 conflict events that could not be geocoded to an individual township boundary. These unmapped events encompass spatially diffuse developments, such as the mass cross-boundary displacement between Sittwe and Ponnagyun and the 23 March column engagement along the Sagaing–Wetlet highway.
6Actors
Structure of the War and Frontline Forces
Out of 1,815 armed conflict events recorded this quarter, the Myanmar military participated in 1,610, with a total of 150 unique participating entities recorded across these events. This distribution captures the structurally asymmetric architecture of the war: a single institutional military confronting a geographically dispersed array of local resistance organizations across multiple fronts. Excluding broad coding aggregates such as "Combined Group" (284 events) and "Unidentified Armed Group" (400 events), the Arakan Army (AA) was the most active named actor, participating in 222 events, directly reflecting the intense frontlines in Kyaukpyu and Ponnagyun.
Table 6Acting parties
Actingparty
Events
Eventscarryingaciviliandeath
Civiliandeaths
MyanmarMilitary
3,416
277
828
UnidentifiedArmedGroup
298
36
54
CombinedGroup
266
5
7
Protesters
217
—
—
ULA/AA
187
—
—
SAC
183
—
—
Administrator
109
2
2
MNTJP/MNDAA
107
3
5
KIO/KIA
79
—
—
Police
76
2
2
(noactingpartyrecorded)
—
8
10
KawThooLeiArmy
—
2
4
PrisonGuards
—
3
3
PyuSawHtee
—
3
3
Blanks are excluded: 51 events record no acting party. 228 distinct acting parties appear in the period.
This is not a ranking of responsibility. The first column counts how often a party is recorded as acting; the second and third count what the record attributes to it. They are different measures.
Attribution of Civilian Fatalities
While total civilian fatalities declined quarter-on-quarter, the proportion attributable to military operations rose from 82.1% to 87.9% (828 out of 942 recorded civilian deaths). Civilian physical peril became increasingly concentrated around military kinetic actions. Disaggregating events by layer confirms that the vast majority of civilian deaths occurred not as incidental casualties within armed battles (65 deaths), but within the protest and crackdown layer of Table 7 (844 deaths: the 822 civilian deaths in violence against civilians given in section 4, and 22 in other event types of that layer).
Table 7The two layers compared
Protestandcrackdown
ArmedConflict
Outsidebothlayers
Events
3,264
1,815
858
Deaths
874
3,980
106
Militaryandpro-coup
1
3,503
40
Armedopposition
7
295
27
Civilians
844
65
33
Notattributed
22
117
6
Protest and crackdown events were most concentrated in Sagaing and Mandalay; armed conflict in Sagaing and Magway.
Event types outside both layers: Other, Strategic Developments, Targeted Violence.
Targeted Violence and Actor Identification Caveats
Out of 41 targeted killing incidents recorded, 11 targeted local administrators, representing the single most targeted demographic group. (Note: Incident data does not establish the organizational identity of perpetrators in these targeted killings).
Concurrently, several actors unrecorded in the fourth quarter of 2025 appeared in this quarter's screening. The Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA) engaged military-aligned PNO forces in Mawkmai, while specialized drone units, such as the Mon–Tanintharyi Brothers Drone Coalition, emerged across the southeastern coastal front. However, because unidentified armed groups were involved in 22.0% of all armed conflict events, figures for individually named organizations represent baseline conservative minimums.
7Detention, displacement and other indicators
Displacement Surge and Mass Flight Dynamics
Recorded displacement reached 857,498 (times people were displaced), rising 40.8% over the preceding quarter. (Note: This metric reflects instances of displacement, not unique headcounts). Over half of this volume (51.3%) was generated by just five mass-flight events, meaning the quarterly surge was driven by a small number of large-scale population flights.
Reported drivers of displacement centered on military air and artillery bombardment, advancing ground columns, and frontline movements. In January, intensive air and artillery strikes on Katha Township displaced people 100,000 times. In March, the AA’s advance toward Ponnagyun displaced people 200,000 times between Sittwe and Ponnagyun, while the military offensive against Tagaung displaced people a further 100,000 times. Civilians faced compounded insecurity even in designated shelters, as seen in March when an airstrike bombed a monastery sheltering displaced persons in Katha Township. With international aid channels blocked, local responders and their support networks bore the direct burden of survival assistance.
Displacement figures count recorded displacement, not distinct people. One person displaced three times appears three times.
Detention Trends and the February Correlation
The total number of people detained (9,285) declined by 26.6% compared to the prior quarter. However, monthly tracking reveals that February was the peak month for detentions (3,978 people detained), coinciding in timing with the quarter's highest recorded forced recruitment and portering operations (132 events). At the township level, Monywa recorded the highest number of people detained. In Myawaddy Township, a Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) faction forcibly rounded up over 300 youths as porters, with some taken at gunpoint. (Note: Data does not confirm whether these 300 individuals are subsumed within Myawaddy’s recorded total of 533 people detained).
Figure 4The 10 townships recording the most people detained
These ten townships account for 4,173 of the 9,285 people recorded detained in the period. 1,176 sit on events that could not be resolved to township level.
Amnesty Caveats and Prisoner Releases
Total releases reached 15,673 individuals; however, these were driven primarily by two state amnesties declared by the military authorities: 6,134 on 4 January and 7,337 on 2 March. Because these amnesties drew from the general nationwide prison population—including non-political criminal convicts—they do not indicate the release of individuals detained in connection with active conflict, nor can they be compared directly against conflict-related detention totals.
Defection Dynamics and Disputed Surrender Claims
Recorded defections and surrenders rose steadily each month. However, March figures include a disputed military claim on 19 March alleging that 506 resistance personnel surrendered. Local resistance commanders dismissed this claim as psychological warfare, underscoring that the apparent increase rests on disputed data.
In focus: Record Surge in Forced Conscription and Porter Duty
In focusForced conscription and porter duty, by quarter, Q1 2024 – Q1 2026
Quarter
Events
Peopletaken
Shareofallpeopledetained
Q12024
29
797
11.3%
Q22024
64
1,341
20.1%
Q32024
95
1,443
10.9%
Q42024
216
2,241
32.5%
Q12025
188
1,718
35.6%
Q22025
94
1,115
33.9%
Q32025
166
2,268
37.8%
Q42025
249
2,551
20.2%
Q12026
320
4,271
46.0%
People taken is the number of people recorded detained on forced conscription and porter duty events. Quarters before 2024 recorded at most 351 people a quarter.
Ground Dynamics and Record Scale
On 3 January, a Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) faction forcibly abducted over 300 youths as porters in Myawaddy Township, with some taken at gunpoint. In February, a military column comprising more than 500 newly conscripted recruits mounted an offensive against Hpasawng in Kayah State. These frontline episodes illustrate the acute forced mobilization crisis that emerged during the quarter.
Across the quarter, a total of 4,271 individuals were recorded as having been abducted for military service or porter duty. This represents the highest quarterly volume recorded since MCARI began data collection in the first quarter of 2021, substantially exceeding the previous peak of 2,551 individuals in the fourth quarter of 2025. Even excluding the single largest mass abduction incident (325 individuals), the remaining total of 3,946 individuals still surpasses all prior quarterly highs, demonstrating that this unprecedented surge was not driven by an isolated outlier.
Nature of Detentions and Proportional Shifts
Although the total number of people detained fell by 26.6% compared to the previous quarter, individuals forcibly abducted for military service or porter duty constituted 46.0% of all people detained. This proportion also sets an all-time MCARI record, surpassing the previous peak of 37.8% in the third quarter of 2025. While detentions related to other political and conflict categories contracted, abductions for recruitment and porterage continued to rise. We assess that nearly half of all detentions recorded this quarter were primarily directed toward extracting manpower and forced labor for the war effort.
Long-Term Trajectory and the February Temporal Alignment
Over the longer term, quarterly abductions for military service or porter duty never exceeded 351 individuals prior to 2024. Following the military's activation of the People’s Military Service Law in February 2024, these detentions rose substantially despite short-term fluctuations, culminating in this quarter’s historical peak. Disaggregating by month, February recorded the highest total (2,118 individuals across 132 events), coinciding with the timing detailed in Sections 2 and 3, in which the military mounted counter-offensives to recapture urban centers using columns composed of newly conscripted personnel. We assess that rising frontline manpower requirements amid intensifying combat were directly aligned in timing with this sharp surge in forced abductions.
Perpetrators and Geographic Distribution
While the military accounted for the vast majority of abductions (3,284 individuals), a DKBA faction forcibly took approximately 300 youths, and a People’s Defense Force (PDF) unit in Tamu District was recorded abducting 200 individuals. Thus, forced conscription and porterage were not exclusively practiced by the military, but also occurred among certain ethnic armed organizations and local resistance groups. Geographically, Sagaing Region recorded by far the highest volume, with 1,989 abductions—surpassing all other states and regions by several multiples—followed by Kayin State with 312.
Data Definitions and Methodological Limitations
The statistics presented in this section capture only events involving actual, physical abductions and detentions on the ground. Coercive pressures such as compiling household rosters, assigning village recruitment quotas, or issuing administrative summons are categorized and tracked separately as "Intimidation." Furthermore, because this metric aggregates both conscription and porter duty without disaggregation, and excludes individuals who reported for service when summoned under the law, it should not be interpreted as representing the total overall intake of military conscripts.
8What this period does not show
Of the 5,937 events recorded this quarter, 1,990 rest on sources that did not say whether anyone died, so the record cannot confirm what happened to the people caught up in them. For 145 of the dead, the record cannot yet say which side they were on.
Likewise, 653 events could not be placed to a township: 472 are known only to a district or to a region or state, 117 concern the whole country and 64 are known only to a town.
Every one of the 37 event types was recorded at least once this quarter, and no party with ten or more events in the fourth quarter of 2025 is absent from this quarter's record. A zero means that nothing was recorded; it does not mean that nothing happened. Some military death figures rest on statements by the parties to the fighting, which limits how far they can be independently confirmed.
9Method in brief
All data and statistics in this issue are drawn from the MCARI_2021-2026_v1.0 dataset. The quarter under review (1 January to 31 March 2026; 90 days) encompasses 5,937 conflict events, each systematically verified and recorded from the reporting of Myanmar news media.
Quarter-on-quarter (QoQ) comparisons are made against the fourth quarter of 2025 (92 days), and year-on-year (YoY) comparisons against the first quarter of 2025. All comparative periods represent full three-month quarters drawn from the same release dataset; raw event counts are compared directly.
Where news sources report ambiguous quantities, fixed imputation rules are applied (e.g., "some" is coded as 3). In this quarter, 175 events involving 556 fatalities were recorded using this imputation rule. A total of 653 events could not be geocoded to an individual township boundary and are excluded from township-level spatial analyses. Side affiliation could not be established for 145 fatalities. Displacement metrics represent instances of displacement, not unique population counts.
All figures in this report are conservative minimum estimates; a zero indicates an absence of reports, not the verified absence of events.
What to Watch Next Quarter
Based on records through 31 March 2026, five key military and humanitarian trends warrant close observation in the second quarter:
Civilian Fatality Trajectory — Civilian fatalities rose steadily from January through March. Whether this upward trajectory persists into the second quarter must be monitored. However, because one or two mass-casualty events (such as the Katha monastery airstrike) can substantially shift monthly totals, three months of data remain insufficient to establish a structural, long-term trend.
The Rakhine Front and the Sittwe Perimeter — Through 31 March, records show the AA advancing toward Ponnagyun, with hostilities shifting toward the state capital, Sittwe. Active combat and displacement patterns around Sittwe Township require ongoing monitoring. It must be noted that displacement figures for this corridor rest largely on a single conservative minimum figure of "more than 200,000" times people were displaced.
Recapture Operations in the Northern Heartland — In Sagaing and Mandalay regions, military counter-offensives against Katha and Tagaung continued during March. Territorial control shifts and renewed displacement in these contested areas must be watched. Because territorial shifts during the first quarter were symmetrical across both sides, there is currently no evidence of unidirectional momentum.
The Eastern Bago Corridor — Conflict events in eastern Bago surged by 67.0%, marked by kinetic activity along the old Yangon–Mandalay highway. Future quarterly data will determine whether this represents a sustained operational shift along this strategic artery or a temporary quarterly spike.
Defection and Surrender Figures — While monthly defections and surrenders trended upward, more than half of the March aggregate rests on a single disputed military claim (506 personnel). This figure should not be interpreted as an established ground trend.